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Abstract 
 
The question of the intrinsic nature of concrete reality is one of the most intriguing in 
all of metaphysics. At its heart lies what has become known as the mind-body problem, a 
recurrent issue in our attempts to reconcile the notions of mind and body and their 
characteristics within a single ontology. In recent years, discussions of the mind-body problem 
have predominantly dealt with qualia and intentionality, the qualitative and representational 
aspects of mind, respectively. This dissertation, however, shows that a third option is available 
as well. Named clear awareness, this third aspect of mind is here identified as a central and 
necessary condition for mentality and, thus, as a novel, relevant player in the ongoing debate.  
The main thesis defended in this dissertation is that clear awareness is non-reducible 
and fundamental in a way that supports a version of panpsychism. Non-reductionism is the view 
that at least certain mental phenomena are not metaphysically reducible to anything else. The 
latter, panpsychism, is much stronger, claiming that mind is both fundamental and ubiquitous, 
that is, present “inside” everything.  
To argument for these points, a broad discussion is given. I advance an argument for the 
fundamentality of clear awareness, which in turn becomes an argument for a clear-awareness-
based version of panpsychism. The argument, however, is aimed at supporting only the 
fundamentality of mind so that the ubiquitousness criterion of panpsychism remains, due to the 
shortness of this dissertation, only an assumption. The resulting thesis is that of CA-
Panpsychism – the view that the clear awareness aspect of consciousness is a metaphysically 
fundamental and ubiquitous character of concrete reality. This thesis offers an account of the 
world as a mental realm within which all of our other ideas about nature and its workings are 
kept safely intact. 
 
Key words: mind-body problem; consciousness; clear awareness; non-reductionism; 
panpsychism  
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1 Clear awareness as a central aspect of consciousness 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this first section is to present the general mind-body problem in relation to 
consciousness. I will start by giving a short overview of the problematic relationship between 
mind and body and then proceed to narrow down the problem. First, I will restrict it to a 
metaphysical debate and, second, I shall opt for consciousness as a route to solving the problem. 
Specifically, I will point out and clarify the aspect of conscious experience that needs to be 
addressed if this problem is to be engaged with in a novel way. 
1.2 The mind-body problem 
We all know that we have conscious experience. For example, we have conscious 
experiences when we perceive a coloured object, hear music, when we feel pain or are rejoicing 
at the sight of a loved one. Popularly understood, the terms “experiential” and “consciousness” 
refer to what is usually called “mind”. Where we to investigate the nature of the world, by virtue 
of our awareness and introspection, we would conclude that at least some parts of the world are 
mental. However, our own experiences seem to suggest the existence of an objective world 
which we cannot experience intrinsically, that is, “from the inside”. This objective world, 
therefore, seems devoid of experience – it is not enminded, so to say. Consequently, its nature 
seems to be radically different than that of our mind. Size, weight, shape, position and motion 
are all characteristics that we would readily attribute to the objective world but would be 
reluctant to apply to the concept of mind. Likewise, characteristics such as subjectivity, 
perception, emotions and thoughts seem exclusively mental. Because of this, we have a 
discrepancy. We have the general notion of “body” which has, in this context, most often been 
regarded as non-mental and thus incompatible or contradictory to the notion of mind. In spite 
of this, we generally attribute mind to other human beings as well as to “higher animals” and, 
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moreover, recognise that we are each other’s “outside” world. However, since we recognise 
that enminded beings like ourselves are an integral part of a seemingly mind-less world, we are 
faced with the dilemma of how to connect mind and body. This mind-body problem, a recurrent 
difficulty in our attempts to reconcile the notions of the mental, the bodily and their 
characteristics, is one of the central questions at the intersection of metaphysics and the 
philosophy of mind.  
In this dissertation, I shall be focused on the metaphysical questions that the problem 
evokes: “What are mental states and what are physical states and how do they relate to each 
other? What is the intrinsic nature of concrete reality?” Through history, these questions have 
been given various answers. Some propose that the world is entirely mental, some that it is 
entirely physical, some that it is neither and some that it is somehow both. Such answers, 
however, can be reached in various ways. One’s approach depends on the aspect of the mental 
or of physical that one addresses. Here, we shall discuss the above metaphysical aspects of the 
mind-body problem in relation to the dimension of mind known as consciousness. 
1.2.1 Terminology 
Before we start, however, a brief terminological clarification is in order. Two terms 
necessarily stand out in any discussion of this kind – the “physical” and the “mental”. Regarding 
the former, for now, it will suffice to say that I will use the terms “physical” and “material” 
interchangeably. Although it is true that physicalism and materialism have different histories, I 
will consider both to be a metaphysical claim that everything is physical or that everything 
supervenes on the physical. The second term, however, is harder to spell out. The mental is 
sometimes identified with consciousness and at other times used as a broader or even narrower 
term. To specify its range without argumentation, however, is to make a metaphysical 
assumption. For this reason, we will start by adopting its most common use in recent debates 
as a term that is broader than consciousness. So much for the mental. As mentioned, the focus 
6 
 
here is on “consciousness”, a term that has often been used in many different ways and quite 
commonly as involving attention or focus. For example, a person might have walked across the 
street while observing the traffic lights and successfully avoided collision with other people and 
all of that time have been lost in thoughts about dinner. The term “conscious”, if it involves 
attention, would not apply here. However, the person was conscious in a broader sense, in the 
sense of having concretely experienced all of that simpliciter. It is in this latter, broader sense 
that I will use the terms “conscious” and “consciousness” and do so interchangeably with 
“experiential” and “experience”. 
1.2.2 A brief overview of consciousness 
Nevertheless, such an understanding of consciousness is insufficient and, for the purposes 
of this dissertation, a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness is required. Recent 
discussions of the mind-body problem have predominantly relied on the two aspects of 
consciousness known as qualia and intentionality, so let us begin by examining these.1 The first 
aspect, qualia, is also called the qualitative feel or phenomenal character of consciousness.2 It 
is the what-it-is-like of an experience. To illustrate, it is the what-it-is-like of seeing blue, the 
blueness of sight. Of course, the mentioned is an isolated instance of phenomenal character. 
Experience, generally, entails not only one but multiple qualities. Seeing blue, for example, 
may be accompanied by a certain feeling such a sight evokes. In any case, examples of qualia 
are: the whiteness of a cloud, pain in my knee, anger, the sound of the sea, the flavour of 
strawberries, hunger, euphoria, the gentleness of touching silk and so on. To sum up, qualia are 
the intrinsic, non-representational properties of conscious experience. Next, the second aspect 
of consciousness, intentionality, is also known as the aboutness or representational character of 
                                                 
1 For example, see Van Gulick (2004), ch. 4 and Gennaro (2015), ch. 3-4. Also, for an overview of the currently 
popular „hard problem of consciousness“  and how it revolves around the concept of qualia, see Weisberg (2015), 
ch. 1-2. 
2 For a more detailed account see Tye (1997). 
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consciousness.3 It is the what-it-is-like of a having a concept or, more strongly, a belief 
associated with a certain experience. To clarify, a visual experience of a computer screen before 
me is about the computer screen, an auditory experience of instrumental music is about the 
music and a tactile experience of the gentleness of silk is about the gentleness and the silk. Most 
if not all conscious experiences are about or represent something, that is, involve an object 
within themselves. For example, in judgement something is affirmed, in love something is 
loved, in sight something is seen and so on. In short, intentionality is the representational 
framework underpinning conscious experience or, in other words, the representations in 
consciousness shaped by a certain associated conceptual content. 4  
Taken together, qualia and intentionality seem to explain the whole of consciousness5 and, 
indeed, they have been almost exclusively called upon in contemporary discussions of the mind-
body problem.6 However, there is a third aspect of consciousness which, I believe, offers a new 
and rewarding perspective to the discussion. This third aspect, which I call clear awareness, is, 
in a sense, in contrast with any other aspect of consciousness. That is why all other aspects of 
consciousness, whatever they may be, can be grouped into a single contrasting aspect. I shall 
call this latter the dramatic aspect of consciousness. Since I will assume that beside clear 
awareness there are only qualia and intentionality, it will be they that compose the dramatic 
aspect. Therefore, as I understand it, consciousness has two major aspects – clear awareness 
and the dramatic aspect. To speak of aspects, however, does not necessarily mean to reify them 
as separate things and the differentiation in this text is done purely for the sake of analysis. Also 
important to observe is that for there to actually be a dramatic aspect, only one of its two aspects 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed account see Jacob (2014). 
4 Note, however, that some philosophers assume that there are representations that are non-conceptual. For 
example, Fred Dretske and Michael Tye see qualia as non-conceptual representations. For a more detailed account 
see Jacob (2014), ch. 10. 
5 There have been attempts to reduce qualia to intentionality and vice versa. However, in this dissertation, for 
purposes of simplicity and brevity, I shall assume that both qualia and intentionality exist. 
6 See footnote 1. 
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is required or, in other words, that qualia and intentionality may occur independently of each 
other.7 That being said, notice that the dramatic aspect will not be relevant to the present 
discussion. As already stated, most recent discussions focus on the dramatic aspect and ignore 
clear awareness and it is for that reason that I will try to do the converse, if only for the sake of 
novelty. Therefore, since my intention in this dissertation is to provide a discussion based on 
the aspect of clear awareness, it is crucial to elaborate it before we proceed any further. 
1.3 Consciousness and clear awareness 
Clear awareness, or CA for short, is the ground or most basic aspect of consciousness. 
For this reason, not only is it a necessary condition to call something “mental” but also, to 
borrow a phrase from Franz Brentano, represents the mark of the mental. 8 This concept of CA 
that I am trying to elaborate was inspired from related ideas within Buddhist philosophy.9 
Unlike Buddhism, however, which is said to use ideas to lead the practitioner towards the 
experiential realization of the nature of mind, I shall be focused on a theoretical clarification of 
what CA would be if it could somehow be the sole object of experience.10 In order to accomplish 
this, I will now draw on related materials found within Nagatomo (2006).11 
Let us begin with an analogy for consciousness.12 Imagine a clear, transparent mirror. It 
may either face something or nothing at all.  
“If it does not face a thing, no image is reflected in it. To say that it mirrors an image 
means that because it faces something, it just mirrors its image. […] That the mirror 
                                                 
7 My own standpoint is that qualia are always present as opposed to intentionality which need not be. 
8 Jacob (2014), ch. 1. 
9 Intellectually, CA is parallel to what is known in Buddhism as the emptiness aspect of mind; not to be confused 
with emptiness itself. 
10 Which it actually cannot, since it cannot be an object for itself, nor can it be isolated. 
11 The chapters I will be drawing on are primarily 6.3 and 7.4. Note, however, that Nagatomo is not presenting CA 
but a different concept called emptiness and is focusing on the meditative experience of said concept. 
12 The analogy is taken from Yanagita (1974), p. 132–3 via Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3. 
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reflects a thing means that it always mirrors regardless of whether it is facing or not 
facing a thing.”13  
Now, notice that the analogy presents the mirror in two modalities: the mirror by itself and the 
mirror as it faces an object. The mirror by itself has no image to mirror; whether an object to 
mirror is present or not is irrelevant for the mirror by itself.14 The mirror by itself is thus 
described as being clear, transparent and as always mirroring. These indicate the mirror’s 
intrinsic nature – it is constant and pure. To say that it is constant means that it is eternal, 
unchanging and that it does not admit of gradation. It does not change whether it mirrors an 
object or not, nor due to the kind of object it mirrors.15 Furthermore, since the mirror’s nature 
is pure, that is, nothing except its constant activity of mirroring, it does not impose form on that 
which is mirrored. In terms of consciousness, the mirror’s intrinsic nature, its constant and pure 
activity of mirroring is CA. Everything else is the dramatic aspect. To be more precise, the 
image being mirrored represents qualia, while the form imposed on that image represents 
intentionality. Since it is not contingent on any specific experience, CA is always present in 
consciousness and is always of the same nature: constant, pure and prefixed as first-person i.e. 
mental. We might also call CA “the light of consciousness”, while the dramatic aspect “the 
illuminated” for without CA qualia and intentionality would not have a space in which to 
appear, so to say, and without qualia, at least, CA would not have anything to “illuminate”. The 
relationship between CA and qualia is the same as the relationship between existence 
simpliciter and existence-in-some-way, existence-how. It is for this reason that CA and qualia 
are only conceptually distinguishable but actually inseparable. This is one reason why CA can 
never be directly observed. Another reason is that CA, which is the observer, cannot observe 
itself since nothing can at one and the same time be an object for itself. The closest one can 
                                                 
13 Yanagita (1974), p. 132–3 via Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3 
14 Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3. 
15 Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3. 
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come to experiencing CA then would be by completely removing intentionality from one’s 
conscious experience; a feat that is theoretically possible because of the pure nature of CA as 
described above. Since it is difficult to think one’s way to CA, for the sake of clarification then, 
let us try to provide a description of the awareness conceived in such a way. Nagatomo (2006) 
calls this Zen “seeing”. 
Returning to our mirror analogy, the mirror is pure i.e. clear, transparent insofar as there 
is no determination in its activity of mirroring. It reflects objects exactly as they are without 
imposing structure, form, making any value discrimination or judgement. In such a seeing, 
therefore, there are no representations in consciousness shaped by a certain associated 
conceptual content. In other words, the nature of such a seeing is holistic, non-dualistic. As 
Nagatomo nicely describes it: 
“Conceptually, […] this holistic perspective [is taken] to mean the [epistemological 
collapse of polar opposites i.e. the] de-substantialization and de-ontologization of 
any two polar concepts, such as one and many, being and non-being, universal and 
particular, absolute and relative, transcendence and immanence, and birth and 
death. [The] observation is that each of the polar terms is non-dualistically related 
to each of the other polar terms such that they are connected with, interdependent 
on, and relative to, each other for their being and meaning.”16 
Things perceived in such a way are seen as being empty of an essence or self-nature which is 
in direct contrast to our everyday experience of perceiving the world as constituted out of many 
independent entities, including a subject of experience. Here, the subject of experience and all 
of the experienced become one continuous whole. This state marks the cessation and 
transcendence of the discriminatory activity of consciousness, a rejection of the belief that there 
is a reality corresponding to a name or concept.17 In short, it is a rejection of Husserl’s 
                                                 
16 Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3. 
17 Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3. 
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intentionality thesis. This means that while thinking, linguistic activity and conceptualization 
are active, these subtler aspects of consciousness are obscured. One can only access CA pre-
reflectively. Furthermore, such an awareness enables one to refute the idea that a subject is a 
tabula rasa or inert being upon which certain features are imprinted.18 According to Nagatomo: 
“These implications are suggested because [such an] awareness arises out of the 
state of no-ego in which no projection from the unconscious and no superimposition 
of intellectual ideas occur in the field of meditative awareness.”19  
In such an awareness all appearances are “equal” insofar as there is no hierarchy and no Gestalt 
distinction between foreground and background. For example, the feeling of being a subject is 
just an appearance in CA just as seeing the sky and trees is an appearance. There is no distinction 
between the subject and the world just as on a screen there is no distinction between the image 
of the person and that of its surroundings – they are just different features of one and the same 
image. In this awareness neither space nor time are perceived as a container but are rather 
expressions of the phenomena themselves, another feature of the image, so to say. 
“In phenomenological terms, [since] there is no thetic positing in this kind of seeing 
[…] the noetic act is rendered nothing. Accordingly, the noematic object is allowed 
to announce itself without an intentional constitution by the latter. This is the 
meaning of “no projection” and “no superimposition” mentioned above. It 
consequently opens up a bottomless horizon, on which a noematic object announces 
itself in toto as a phenomenon.”20 
Zen master Dōgen illustrates this by noting that “nothing is hidden in the universe.”21 To 
summarise, all of the above characteristics of seeing can be condensed into a single phrase – 
                                                 
18 See Nagatomo (2006), ch. 7.4. 
19 Nagatomo (2006), ch. 7.4. 
20 Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3 and 7.4. 
21 trans. Nearman, H. (2007), p. 669. 
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motion in stillness (seichū no dō).22 In such an awareness, the subject recognizes that they are 
not really the subject but rather CA which “sees” the dramatic aspect of consciousness in which 
the experience of being a subject, a human being, for example, is included. Of course, since CA 
cannot be directly observed, the recognition is, ultimately, that of the inseparability of CA and 
the dramatic aspect. Buddhists would say that by recognizing that you are nothing, you 
recognize that you are everything. More precisely, in this kind of awareness one does not 
experience CA as an object. Rather, the recognition mentioned above refers to the experiential 
fact that seeing has turned into one’s basic nature of consciousness - the inseparability of CA 
and qualia.23 Since the attainment of the latter state of mind is pre-reflective and actualised 
rather than grasped as though being an object, it can be known fully and intimately. 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this section, I have given an overview of the mind-body problem and presented 
consciousness as one of the dimensions of mind that is at the focus of contemporary discussions 
of the mentioned problem. Specifically, I have isolated from the phenomenon of conscious 
experience the aspect of clear awareness. It is hoped that such an approach will provide a novel 
and clearer grasp of the discussion and so contribute to the eventual resolution of the 
metaphysical predicament. The next step is, therefore, to see how the mind-body problem can 
be solved in relation to this specific aspect of consciousness and our mental life. 
 
                                                 
22 Nagatomo (2006), ch. 7.4. 
23 See Nagatomo (2006), ch. 6.3. 
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2 The fundamentality of clear awareness 
2.1 Introduction 
After having clarified the notion of clear awareness and its relation to the other aspects 
of consciousness in the previous section, in this section I will offer an argument for the 
conclusion that clear awareness is metaphysically fundamental. I will present several available 
positions that one can take with regard to the mind-body debate and gradually eliminate those 
options that prove to be untenable in connection with the above elaborated understanding of 
consciousness.  
2.2 An overview of the available positions 
Since there are many available positions that one can take when discussing the mind-
body problem, I will try to narrow these down to several positions which represent the main 
routes of argumentation in contemporary debates. They are eliminativism regarding the mind 
and two blocks of positions – reductionism and non-reductionism. Among the reductionist 
positions, I will explore the options of identity physicalism and neutral monism, while among 
the non-reductionist positions, I will explore dualism (substance and property), emergentism 
(as supervenience physicalism) and panpsychism. 
2.2.1 Eliminativism 
Eliminativism or eliminative materialism is a metaphysical position which claims that at 
least some of the mental states that we usually presume to exist are actually non-existent and 
thus illusions.24 The claim implies that we are deeply mistaken regarding some or all of our 
psychological states and processes and that upon scrutiny it will be found that some or all of 
these do not actually exist even though, as concepts, they play an important role in folk 
                                                 
24 For more details see Ramsey (2003), Churchland (1981) and Dennet (1991). 
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psychology. Contemporary discussion lists such examples as beliefs, desires but also qualia and 
consciousness itself. For example, on this view, “the “inner light” we associate with 
consciousness may be nothing more than a remnant of misguided Cartesian intuitions.”25 
Let us consider shortly the position of eliminativism with regard to CA. According to 
such a position, believing in the existence of CA is but a false intuition, an introspective mistake. 
Nevertheless, as elaborated in the first section of this dissertation, we can be certain of CA’s 
existence. On the one hand, this may be achieved by coupling introspection with an 
understanding of the inseparability of qualia and CA and, on the other, by direct experience. 
The awareness involving CA is an experiential fact that cannot be a product of clouded 
judgement since the very experience of it becomes more evident as judgement and 
conceptualisation are cleared away. On the present understanding of mind, there would never 
have been any conscious experience in the whole of existence were it not for the aspect of clear 
awareness. In short, I conclude that this “knowing” aspect of consciousness is the single most 
secure thing we know about reality and hereby discard the option of eliminativism about CA. 
Notice, however, that eliminativism about qualia, for example, might still be a viable 
option. Even so, on the present understanding of consciousness, that would be irrelevant to the 
present discussion. Truly, I have written that qualia and CA are inseparable, yet only because 
that is what I took to be the representative of a minimal dramatic aspect of consciousness. CA 
must be inseparable with some part of the dramatic aspect and, because of the previously 
elaborated reasons, it cannot be intentionality but it may be some other part of the dramatic 
aspect, perhaps one that we have not yet described. Because of this, eliminativism about qualia 
and other parts of the dramatic aspect need not worry the proponent of CA, unless the 
eliminativism addresses the whole of the dramatic aspect or consciousness itself. And so, as 
eliminativism is discarded as a plausible route, we may move on to exploring other options. 
                                                 
25 Ramsey (2003), ch. 3.3. 
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2.2.2 Reductionism and non-reductionism 
When it comes to the status of mind, philosophers are usually divided between two 
broad camps: reductionists and non-reductionists. The former believe that mind is reducible to 
something more fundamental, while the latter that it is not.  
2.2.3 Physicalism and identity physicalism 
One reductionist position is identity physicalism. Physicalism in general is the thesis that 
everything is physical or that everything supervenes on the physical.26 Let us quickly address 
the terminology here. Just as throughout this dissertation, the term ‘‘physical” is used 
interchangeably with ‘‘material.” Furthermore, supervenience is a term designating a specific 
kind of relation which can be explained in the following way:  
“A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two 
things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to 
their B-properties. In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-
difference”.” 27 
Once the B set is given, the A set automatically appears.  
Identity physicalism, being a subcategory of physicalism, leaves notions of supervenience 
on the side and claims simply that everything is physical or, in other words, attempts to directly 
identify the mental with the physical. There are two conceptions of the physical, however, and 
they are crucial in any debate involving physicalist claims. Stoljar (2001) presents these in 
chapter 11 of his article on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The first is the theory 
based conception:  
                                                 
26 Stoljar (2001). 
27 McLaughlin and Bennett (2005). For more details see also Francescotti (2015). 
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“A property is physical iff it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells 
us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the 
sort of property that physical theory tells us about.”28  
The second is the object based conception:  
“A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete 
account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their 
constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on 
the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of 
paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents.”29 
As already mentioned, the position of identity physicalism avoids notions of supervenience and 
assumes direct identity between what is regarded as mental and the physical. 
2.2.4 Neutral monism 
The second reductionist position is neutral monism.30 According to this position, reality 
is fundamentally neither mental nor physical but rather made of a wholly non-mental and a 
wholly non-physical neutral substance. On this view, the mental and the physical are not 
fundamentally different kinds of stuff but only different modes of presentation of one and the 
same neutral substance.  
Were one to show, however, that there is indeed something mental, for example, CA that 
is incompatible with the physical vis-à-vis the given definitions of the physical, then one could 
discard neutral monism as a viable option within the mind-body debate. Alternatively, it would 
also suffice to acknowledge the existence of either mental stuff or physical stuff since in that 
case neutral monism would be eliminated on pain of logical impossibility. The reason is simple; 
the underlying neutral substance cannot be neither mental nor non-mental or, conversely, it 
                                                 
28 Stoljar (2001), ch. 11. 
29 Stoljar (2001), ch. 11. 
30 For a more detailed account see Stubenberg (2005). 
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cannot be neither physical nor non-physical. For example, if the reader were to recognize 
consciousness or, more specifically, CA as an existent, mental aspect of the world, the 
possibility of a neutral wholly non-mental reality would immediately cease. Since this is 
precisely my standpoint in this dissertation, I will now discard the option of neutral monism. 
2.2.5 Substance and property dualism 
The first non-reductionist position that we shall explore is dualism. There are two basic 
types of dualism in metaphysics: substance dualism and property dualism.31 The former holds 
that concrete reality is made of two ultimately different types of properties, while the latter of 
two ultimately different types of substances. The main difference between these two lies in the 
weight given to the concept of substance over the concept of property. Substance dualists 
believe that a thing is more than the collection of its properties and therefore identify substance 
as an underlying entity which possesses those properties. According to this view, the mind is 
more than a collection of mental states, it is the object that has them; in the same way, a subject 
of experience is more than a bundle of experiences, it is something over and above the 
experiences. To sum up, the mental and the physical are seen as two incompatible properties 
by property dualists and as two incompatible substances by substance dualists. 
Both these positions, I believe, offer a fundamentally divided metaphysics and thus fail 
to give an account of the relation between the mental and the physical. Since my intention in 
this dissertation is precisely to explore this relation or, in other words, to offer a monistic 
solution to the mind-body problem, I will ignore all dualist positions. 
                                                 
31 Predicate dualism is ignored here since it is about language rather than the world. For more information see 
Robinson (2003). 
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2.2.6 Emergentism (supervenience physicalism)  
The second non-reductionist position is emergentism. The concept of emergence is 
generally taken to mean an arising of certain entities out of more fundamental ones such that 
the arisen entities are novel in respect with and irreducible to the more fundamental ones.32 One 
should note, however, that there are two types of emergence - the epistemological and 
metaphysical kind – and that the given description is much closer to the metaphysical than the 
epistemological. To clarify, epistemological emergence is “complexity, perhaps of a high 
enough degree to stop all attempts at practical prediction and explanation;”33 it deals with 
knowledge and the inability to get to know a phenomenon, either presently or in principle. On 
the other hand, metaphysical emergence deals not with knowledge but with concrete reality, it 
is “the production of genuinely novel, causally efficacious features of the world, stemming from 
the combination of fundamental components”34 and laws which connect the emergent features 
with the underlying complex structures; it presents a layered view of the world with a specific 
science for every such layer. As a standard metaphysical position, emergentism corresponds to 
this latter, metaphysical type. On this picture, metaphysical emergence is seen as a 
“supervenience relation which holds in virtue of emergent laws, which are fundamental laws.”35 
Moreover, since all contemporary forms of emergentism rely on physicalism, such a position 
might be characterised as a non-reductive supervenience physicalism or, for short, as 
supervenience physicalism. 
2.2.7 Panpsychism 
The third and last of the non-reductionist positions is panpsychism. It is the view that 
mind, however one conceives of it, is a metaphysically fundamental and ubiquitous character 
                                                 
32 O'Connor and Wong (2002). 
33 Seager (2009), p. 207. 
34 Seager (2009), p. 210. 
35 O'Connor and Wong (2002), ch. 3.1. 
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of concrete reality.36 To say that it is fundamental means that it is not reducible to anything else, 
either epistemologically or metaphysically or, in other words, that it is neither epistemologically 
nor metaphysically emergent. Furthermore, to say that it is ubiquitous means that it partakes in 
every aspect of concrete reality. Since a deeper exploration of panpsychism awaits in the third 
section of this dissertation, I shall now proceed to the argument for the fundamentality of CA. 
2.3 The argument for the fundamentality of clear awareness 
2.3.1 The argument 
I shall now provide an argument to show that the aspect of consciousness I have named 
“clear awareness” or “CA”, for short, is a fundamental character of concrete reality. 
The argument can be presented in a succinct way as follows: 
1) CA either exists or CA does not exist. 
2) If CA does not exist, it is not fundamental. 
3) If CA exists, it is either reducible or not reducible to the physical. 
4) If it is reducible then one of following is true: 
4.1) CA is outright identical with the physical. 
4.2) CA is epistemologically emergent on the physical. 
5) If, on the other hand, CA is not reducible to the physical, then one of the following is true: 
5.1) CA is metaphysically emergent from the physical. 
5.2) CA is fundamental. 
6) And, the following premises are true: 
6.1) CA exists. 
6.2) CA is mental and thus not outright identical with the physical. 
                                                 
36 See also Seager (2009), p. 206. 
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6.3) If CA exists and is not outright identical with the physical then it may still be 
emergent or fundamental. 
6.4) If CA is emergent then it is either epistemologically or non-epistemologically 
emergent. 
6.5) CA is not epistemologically emergent on the physical. 
6.6) CA is not non-epistemologically i.e. metaphysically emergent from the physical 
because such emergence is incoherent. 
7) Therefore, CA is fundamental. 
2.3.2 A short analysis of the argument 
Let us examine the argument more closely. Premise 1) “CA either exists or CA does not 
exist.” is but a clear example of the law of the excluded middle. Something either exists or it 
does not exist; there is no need for any special clarification or defence. Premise 2) “If CA does 
not exist, it is not fundamental.” Points out the obvious fact that CA cannot be a fundamental 
character of concrete existence if it does not even exist. Premise 3) “If CA exists, it is either 
reducible or not reducible to the physical.”, just like premise 1), is another example of the law 
of the excluded middle. If CA exists it is either reducible or else non-reducible, since the concept 
of reducibility does not allow partiality. For this reason, cases of both-and and neither-nor are 
excluded. Premise 4) “If it is reducible then one of following is true: 4.1) CA is outright identical 
with the physical. 4.2) CA is epistemologically emergent on the physical.” merely reiterates the 
available metaphysical positions I have already presented above. In short, premise 4) states that 
in the case of reductionism the available options are identity physicalism or, if we are unable to 
provide a clear identification, at least epistemological emergence – a claim that CA cannot be 
explained via recourse to the physical but is still believed to be reducible to it. In the same way, 
premise 5) “If, on the other hand, CA is not reducible to the physical, then one of the following 
is true: 5.1) CA is metaphysically emergent from the physical. 5.2) CA is fundamental.” 
reiterates the available positions from the non-reductionist block presented above. The claim is 
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that if CA is not reducible to the physical, then it is either metaphysically emergent or else 
fundamental. Premise 6) “And, the following premises are true:” offers a list of premises that 
after scrutiny are believed to be true. They are “6.1) CA exists. 6.2) CA is mental and thus not 
outright identical with the physical. 6.3) If CA exists and is not outright identical with the 
physical then it may still be emergent or fundamental. 6.4) If CA is emergent then it is either 
epistemologically or non-epistemologically emergent. 6.5) CA is not epistemologically 
emergent on the physical. 6.6) CA is not non-epistemologically i.e. metaphysically emergent 
from the physical because such emergence is incoherent.” These premises have to be defended 
and in case such a defence is successful, they yield the conclusion that 7) “Therefore, CA is 
fundamental.” Now follows the defence. 
2.3.3 A defence of the fundamentality of CA 
Let us begin with premise 6.1) “CA exists”. As already discussed above in chapter “2.2.1 
Eliminativism”, the truth of this premise is intimately evident. Moreover, it cannot be a product 
of false or mistaken reasoning since it is arrived at pre-reflectively. Any consciousness 
recognizes that it has this aspect. It may not know it in a propositional sense, but it surely knows 
it in an experiential, pre-reflective way. So much about that.  
Moving on to premise 6.2) “CA is mental and thus not outright identical with the 
physical.” The first part of this premise states that CA’s basic character is mental. This is also 
evidently true for the very reasons explained above regarding premise 6.1). When one 
encounters CA, the encounter is necessarily also with the basic nature of CA or, in other words, 
to know CA is also to know its intrinsic nature. More broadly, by virtue of being a conscious 
being one intimately knows what consciousness is; just as a being with a hand knows how to 
raise a hand even without having studied how to do it. The second part of the premise concludes 
that since CA is mental, it cannot be directly identified with the physical. Of course, one may 
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call CA physical but that would imply that the physical is intrinsically mental, something that 
the physicalist could never accept.  
The next is premise 6.3) “If CA exists and is not outright identical with the physical then 
it may still be emergent or fundamental.” and it is a claim that limits the available options that 
one can take in the present metaphysical debate. It basically says that for any existing entity 
there are four possible metaphysical categories it can be placed in. The entity can be identical 
with what is already considered to be fundamental, it may be emergent, either 
epistemologically37 or metaphysically, or it may replace the existing paradigm and be 
fundamental in its own right.38 Let me reiterate this in a different way. The newly discovered 
phenomenon may be identified as a form of the already recognized fundamental stuff or, if such 
an identification fails, this is due to one of two possible reasons. The first reason is the inability 
of explanation – either the knower or the world limit the acquisition of knowledge. The former 
indicates epistemological emergence, while the latter metaphysical emergence. To clarify, if it 
is the knower that limits knowledge, it is either the case that we cannot know the phenomenon 
in question because of a priori reasons such as the nature of mind, of knowledge or of logic in 
general, or because we are beings that are ill-equipped for such endeavours. If, on the other 
hand, it is the world that limits knowledge, then it must mean that there is a certain layer of the 
world which remains inaccessible to investigation. If neither of these two are the case, then the 
problem is not an inability of explanation, but the lack of an explanation itself. This is the second 
reason why identification may fail. In such a case, we are compelled to posit the fundamentality 
of the discovered phenomenon. In our example, since CA is mental, it cannot be identical with 
the physical. This leaves open the options that CA is emergent, either epistemologically or 
                                                 
37 Strictly speaking, this is not a metaphysical category however, it may enter the metaphysical debate. 
38 Excluding co-fundamentality since that would be a dualist/pluralist position and, as explained in chapter 2.2.5, 
we are ignoring those positions. 
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metaphysically, or that it is fundamental in its own right. Since premises 6.1) and 6.2) are true 
and since the given options exhausts all possibilities, this premise is true. 
The following premise 6.4) “If CA is emergent then it is either epistemologically or non-
epistemologically emergent.” is once again the law of the excluded middle and builds on the 
previous premise. It says that in the case of emergence there are but two possibilities: either 
emergence is epistemological or non-epistemological. There is no third option. In general, if a 
phenomenon is classified as emergent that classification means an inability to explain the 
phenomenon by appeal to some more basic stuff such as parts at a lower level of complexity. 
There are two possibilities then as regards metaphysics: either we keep the existing metaphysics 
and claim ignorance or impossibility of gaining knowledge about the phenomenon, or we 
expand the existing metaphysics and postulate a novel, irreducible phenomenon which arises 
out of the more basic stuff. The former claim results in the classification of a phenomenon as 
epistemologically emergent, while the latter as metaphysically i.e. non-epistemologically 
emergent. 
 Now, let us for the moment skip premise 6.5) and go straight to premise 6.6.) “CA is not 
non-epistemologically i.e. metaphysically emergent from the physical because such emergence 
is incoherent.” This is a claim against the rationality of metaphysical or, as it is sometimes 
called, radical emergence. Thomas Nagel, for example, supports the premise when saying that: 
“There are no truly emergent properties of complex systems. All properties of a 
complex system that are not relations between it and something else derive from 
the properties of its constituents and their effect on each other when so combined.”39 
More recently, Galen Strawson has also defended such a position claiming that: 
                                                 
39 Nagel (1979). 
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„The only kind of emergence of Y from X that makes sense is one in which Y is in 
some sense wholly dependent on X and X alone, so that all features of Y trace 
intelligibly back to X.”40 
In short, if we accept that there is something more than regularity when it comes to the nature 
of causality, if we believe that causality entails necessity rather than being purely a matter of 
regular occurrences, then we are assuming a position called causal closure, a potions which, for 
example, every physicalism endorses as well. If we then observe metaphysical i.e. radical 
emergence from such a standpoint, we conclude that in metaphysical emergence the mental is 
causally arisen from where there is none and that is a violation of ex nihilo nihil fit – the basic 
logical tenet which says that something cannot arise out of nothing and, vice versa, that 
something cannot become nothing. Since I will assume causal closure, I conclude that CA, 
which is intrinsically mental, cannot arise out of the physical i.e. something that is intrinsically 
non-mental and that, therefore, premise 6.6) is true. 
 Now we can return to premise 6.5) “CA is not epistemologically emergent on the 
physical.” Let us suppose for a moment that CA is epistemologically emergent from the 
physical. If that is the case then the physical and CA are compatible. Moreover, what follows 
then is that either we have a partial understanding of CA or of the physical, or both. However, 
to begin with, we do have an understanding of the physical. As mentioned before in chapter 
2.2.3 “Physicalism and identity physicalism”, the physicalists themselves provide us with two 
conceptions of what it means to be physical. The first is the theory based conception according 
to which a property is physical if physical theory posits it as such or if it metaphysically 
supervenes on such a property.41 Let’s see if CA can be made compatible with this 
characterization of the physical. First, CA is definitely not a property that physical theory tells 
us about and, second, since metaphysical emergence is incoherent (assuming causal closure) 
                                                 
40 Strawson (2006). 
41 See chapter 2.2.3 
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CA cannot metaphysically emerge from properties that do not include it. Therefore, the theory 
based conception of physicalism is incompatible with CA. The second conception of the 
physical is the object based according to which a property is physical if it is necessarily present 
in a full description of the intrinsic nature of a paradigmatical physical object and its parts or if 
it metaphysically supervenes on such a property.42 Is CA compatible with this second 
characterization of the physical? If CA were part of the intrinsic nature of a paradigmatic 
physical object then the latter would be intrinsically mental, which is contradictory to the idea 
of physicality. However, if CA is not part of the intrinsic nature of a paradigmatic physical 
object, then it cannot emerge from it because, as already stated, metaphysical emergence is 
incoherent. Therefore, neither the theory based nor the object based conceptions of the physical 
are compatible with CA. To sum up, we have said that if CA is epistemologically emergent from 
the physical then: either we have a partial understanding of CA or of the physical, or both. 
However, we do not have a partial understanding of the physical and, moreover, the 
understanding that we have is not compatible with CA. Still, CA might be epistemologically 
emergent from the physical in case we have a partial understanding of CA. So, do we have a 
partial understanding of CA? No, CA is a given, it is known pre-reflectively rather than via 
representation or conceptualization etc. and thus known intimately and fully. That is why we 
could assess its compatibility with the physical in the first place. And so, we have an 
understanding of both CA and the physical and they are still incompatible. The incompatibility 
of the physical and CA, therefore, is not a matter of epistemology but of metaphysics. CA is not 
epistemologically emergent from the physical and, consequently, premise 6.5) is true. 
 There is another reason why CA cannot be epistemologically emergent from the 
physical. I have noticed that in contemporary debates, physicalists see mind and consciousness 
as phenomena that appear when a specific organization of matter on a high enough level of 
                                                 
42 See chapter 2.2.3 
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complexity is achieved. On the present view of consciousness, however, this shows a basic 
confusion between the aspect of CA and the dramatic aspect of consciousness. Let me spell this 
out a bit. As elaborated in chapter 1.3 “Consciousness and clear awareness”, the nature of CA 
is characterized as pure and constant. “Pure” means that CA is nothing but the continuous 
activity of “illuminating” the dramatic aspect, the empty space in which it appears. Presently, 
even more important, however, is the term “constant” which means that CA is eternal, 
unchanging and that it does not admit of gradation. It does not change whether it has qualia or 
not, nor due to the kind, organization, complexity etc. of those qualia and this is crucial. It is 
only the dramatic aspect and its parts that can evolve and change, be simpler or more complex, 
richer or scarcer but not CA. To speak of epistemological emergence then, given the nature of 
CA, is misleading. All consciousnesses have exactly one and the same aspect of CA but may 
differ wildly when it comes to the dramatic aspect. Complexity and organisation, therefore, 
have everything to do with the dramatic aspect but nothing to do with CA. And so, it makes 
sense to speak of the epistemological emergence of qualia, for example, but no sense with 
regard to CA since it cannot arise by being assembled in any way. This is the second reason 
why I conclude that CA is not epistemologically emergent and why premise 6.5) is true. 
2.3.4 The argument’s conclusion 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the argument for the fundamentality of CA can 
be successfully defended. It presents and discards four attempts of either eliminating CA or 
establishing it as something non-fundamental. They are: a) that CA is eliminated in favour of 
the physical, b) that CA is identified with the physical, c) that CA is epistemologically emergent 
on the physical and d) that CA is metaphysically emergent from the physical. There are four 
reasons why these attempts fail to prevent CA from being classified as fundamental and they 
are: a) CA exists, b) CA is mental and thus cannot be identified with the physical, c) CA is not 
epistemologically emergent and d) CA cannot be metaphysically emergent. The only remaining 
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option and, therefore, also the conclusion of the present argument is that CA is a fundamental 
character of concrete reality. Accordingly, the intrinsic nature of concrete existence is mental. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this section I have attempted to offer a monistic solution to the mind-body problem. In 
order to do so, I have argued that the aspect of consciousness called clear awareness is a 
fundamental character of concrete reality. After the argument’s defence, I have concluded that 
the intrinsic nature of concrete existence is mental, rather than physical. However, what remains 
to be clarified is the exact relation that CA has with the “body”. In short, what is now needed 
is a positive account of concrete existence compatible with the given solution to the mind-body 
problem. 
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3 Panpsychism and clear awareness 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section, I will present a version of panpsychism as a viable theory for explaining 
the nature of concrete reality. The version I will present is one compatible with the above given 
solution to the mind-body problem where the clear awareness aspect of consciousness is 
identified as a fundamental aspect of concrete reality. 
3.2 CA-Panpsychism 
3.2.1 Panpsychism in general 
Panpsychism is the view that mind or, in other words, consciousness is a metaphysically 
fundamental (or co-fundamental) and ubiquitous character of concrete reality.43 To say that it 
is fundamental means that it is not reducible to anything else, either epistemologically or 
metaphysically. Furthermore, to say that it is ubiquitous means that it partakes in every aspect 
of concrete reality. Panpsychism has also been characterised as “any view that reunites 
mentality with materiality, and thereby dismantles the foundational dualism of Western 
thought.”44 This leads to a further point – panpsychism is a meta-theory rather than a proper 
theory of mind. As such, its claim is simply that mind applies to all of concrete existence, 
regardless how one comprehends it.45 Here are a few examples. One can be a panpsychist 
property dualist, believing that existence has both irreducibly physical and mental properties, 
the latter being present in all things. One can be a panpsychist personal idealist, believing that 
all things are self-realisations of their own, individual mind. One can be a panpsychist 
functionalist, regarding the functional character of all objects as mentality. Arguably, 
                                                 
43 See Seager (2009), p. 206. 
44 See Mathews (2003), p. 4. 
45 See Skrbina (2005), p. 2. 
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panpsychism is applicable to most contemporary theories of mind. However, it is important to 
note a common misconception regarding panpsychism’s connection with subjective idealism.  
“Panpsychism is sometimes described as a version of [subjective] idealism, but 
such is not necessarily the case. [Subjective] idealism posits mind as the essential 
reality of all things; panpsychism argues, roughly, that all things “have minds.” The 
former is from an external perspective, the latter from an internal one.”46  
This shows that one may be a subjective idealist without being a panpsychist and vice versa. 
Either way, an important insight offered by these remarks is that panpsychism does not deflate 
the outside world to a subject’s sphere of experience as, for example, in the case of George 
Berkeley’s version of idealism where physical objects are merely collections of a subject’s 
sensory impressions. Moreover, when it comes to subjects, one should be aware that:  
“panpsychism does not imply that there are subjects of experience in addition to 
experiential reality, or that everything that exists involves the existence of a subject 
of experience in addition to the existence of experiential reality.”47  
This is, however, not to say that experience does not entail an experiencer.48 As all experience 
is necessarily experience-for, that is, for someone or something, it is necessarily had and entails 
an experiencer. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the experiencer must be irreducibly 
ontologically distinct from the experience itself. Therefore, panpsychism leaves open the 
question whether there is an additional experiencer to experiential reality or whether the two 
are actually one and the same. So much about panpsychism in general. 
3.2.2 CA-Panpsychism 
Panpsychism based on CA or, CA-Panpsychism for short, is not as broad a theory as 
panpsychism in general. Since here “mind” is replaced by the concept of CA, its definition is 
                                                 
46 Skrbina (2005), p. 11. 
47 Strawson (2015). 
48 See Strawson (2015), ch. 12. 
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slightly narrower: CA-Panpsychism is the view that the clear awareness aspect of consciousness 
is a metaphysically fundamental and ubiquitous character of concrete reality. Notice how the 
concept of mind has now become synonymous with consciousness, as understood in this 
dissertation, since everything that happens, happens in CA and, consequently, in consciousness. 
This makes the present variant of panpsychism a so-called “pure” panpsychism. 
In spite of this, CA-Panpsychism retains the title of meta-theory as it allows a range of 
more concrete theories to fall under its scope. As a meta-theory, it simply states that, however 
one conceives of mind, so long as this conception involves CA as its basic aspect, such mind 
will apply to all of concrete existence. Thus, for example, one can be a CA-panpsychist 
subjective idealist or a CA-panpsychist functionalist. The important point here is that CA-
Panpsychism is restricted to monistic theories of concrete reality that posit mind as the ultimate 
nature of the world, rather than matter or some neutral stuff. This is based on the conclusion 
reached in the previous section according to which there is ultimately one kind of stuff in 
concrete existence and it is intrinsically mental since it is marked by CA.49 To exemplify, as a 
result, one cannot be a CA-panpsychist physicalist or a CA-panpsychist property dualist but 
can be a CA-panpsychist objective idealist. 
Another important point is the distinction between the dramatic aspect of mind and CA. 
When panpsychists argue that everything has mind I believe that, in most cases, they mean only 
that everything has this aspect of clear awareness. Furthermore, as the latter cannot exist 
independently of the dramatic aspect, for example, of qualia, everything has at least some 
qualia. On the present view, there is no such thing as the unconscious and the term ideally refers 
to the minimally conscious or, in other words, to the conscious with almost nothing in the 
dramatic aspect. This is only logical since taking mind as an irreducible phenomenon, how 
could one conceive of a person losing consciousness, for example, upon falling asleep and 
                                                 
49 See chapter 2.4. 
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somehow regaining it upon waking up without breaking the principle of the conservation of 
information or, more basically, ex nihilo nihil fit? To illustrate, both a human and a pebble have 
experience insofar as they have the aspect of clear awareness, however the human’s experience 
is content-rich, in terms of qualia perchance, while the pebble’s experience has almost no such 
content. By no means does the CA-panpsychist conceive of sticks and stones as having complex 
emotions, sensations and so on. What is constant, hence, is the CA aspect and what changes 
and evolves is the dramatic aspect. The difference between a pebble and a human being is, 
therefore, a difference in their local dramatic aspect with the human one being richer and more 
organized and the pebble’s being much emptier and disorganized. In brief, it rests upon a proper 
theory of mind and perhaps a theory of epistemological emergence to account for the structure 
and richness of the dramatic aspect and science already does a fairly good job when it comes to 
explaining it. For example, we have a solid intellectual understanding of why and how human 
vision differs from that of a fish or of why and how a human’s sense of smell differs from that 
of a dog. Likewise, science, and especially physics, gives us an elaborate picture of the 
workings of the universe, that is, in this case, of the workings of the dramatic aspect of mind. 
Notice that  
“the panpsychist hypothesis performs a ‘global replace’ on physics as ordinarily 
conceived. In so doing it leaves the whole of physics—everything that is true in 
physics—in place. So too for all the other sciences. […]It leaves the physical world 
untouched, as ‘out there’, relative to each one of us, as it ever was.”50  
  
                                                 
50 Strawson (2015), ch. 13. 
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3.3 Some objections to CA-Panpsychism and replies 
With this general clarification in place, we may now examine panpsychism with regard 
to its position in today’s discussions. One popular problem that many see as intimately 
connected with panpsychism but is actually only pertinent to some of its versions is the so-
called “combination problem”. How can many instances of experience come to constitute a 
single instance?51 The question arises because of three reasons. One is holding that the world is 
composed of a great many components or parts, that is, fragmented and formed out of a host of 
separate objects. The second reason is the belief that a subject of experience is one whole and 
the third is the impossibility to accept some sort of fusion whereby more separate instances of 
experience come to form a single one. For example, if we are composed out of atoms, which, 
according to panpsychism, are themselves subjects of experience, how is any person then a 
single subject of experience? Is there some fusion process that allows this? There are various 
answers to these question and, personally, I do not believe that the combination problem 
presents a threat to panpsychism insofar as I do not believe the world to be fragmented. In a 
continuous world there arises no such problem. However, I am not going to defend this non-
duality thesis at present since I only wanted to inform the reader that there can be a version of 
panpsychism, maybe a CA-Cosmopsychism52, which withstands such counter-arguments. 
 Moving on, from its definition, it is clear that panpsychism contrasts with two of today’s 
mainstream views of reality, namely, mechanism and humanism. Let us first consider 
mechanism. Although universal mechanism, the idea that all natural phenomena can be 
explained mechanically in terms of matter, motion, force and mechanical laws, seems to have 
been abandoned, the philosophy of mind still hosts the debate over the narrower thesis of 
anthropic mechanism, the view that everything about human beings can be explained 
                                                 
51 See Strawson (2015) and Shani (2015). 
52 See Shani (2015). 
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mechanically in the previously mentioned terms.53 However, should one try to reduce the 
mental to or identify it with the material, as does anthropic mechanism, the “hard problem of 
consciousness” springs forth.54 Anti-mechanists such as panpsychists argue that unconscious 
matter cannot completely explain the phenomenon of consciousness or, in other words, that the 
non-experiential cannot completely explain the experiential, at least not the aspect of clear 
awareness. Basically, the problem is that anthropic mechanism, by relying on pure materialism, 
denies the fundamentality of the experiential which is one of the main points of panpsychism. 
On the other hand, another of its main points, the ubiquitousness of the experiential, is contested 
by humanism, which carries the assumption that mind is limited to humans and perhaps the 
“higher animals”.55 Indeed, humans do possess remarkable mental capabilities such as reason, 
language, an array of complex emotions and feelings, however “nothing so unique as to alone 
account for the presence of a mind. What is at issue is not”56 the structure and richness of the 
dramatic aspect of consciousness, but rather the aspect of clear awareness of experience in 
general. Nevertheless, despite the difficult problems they face, mechanism and humanism are 
still deeply ingrained in the collective psyche of the modern Westerner. Since they represent 
the modern scientific worldview, challenging them often means to be marginalised and labelled 
as controversial. This is only natural, since acquiring a certain paradigm makes it a basis for all 
further understanding and action. Everyone is necessarily biased and therein rests the need to 
continually re-examine one’s basic assumptions. There are good reasons to believe CA-
Panpsychism is true or, at least, to consider it a serious candidate for resolving the mind-body 
problem.  
“For most of humanity, for most of history, panpsychism has been an accepted and 
respected view of the world. More to the point, it is a matter of fact that many of 
                                                 
53 See Psillos (2007), p. 149-50. 
54 See Van Gulick (2004), ch. 5.4. 
55 See Skrbina (2005), p. 1. 
56 Skrbina (2005), p. 1. 
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the greatest [Eastern and] Western thinkers advocated some form of panpsychism. 
[…] For this reason alone it is deserving of serious consideration.”57  
Its allure lies with its simplicity and with the apparent fact that it avoids the problems of dualism 
and materialism while at the same time retaining all their benefits. It does not struggle with the 
problem of interaction, nor with the so-called “hard problem of consciousness.” And so, as 
counterintuitive as CA-Panpsychism may seem, it may be perhaps the best theory we have when 
it comes to the nature of reality and that of the mind. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this final section, I have presented CA-Panpsychism as a positive account of concrete 
existence compatible with the above given characterisation of consciousness and solution to the 
mind-body problem. It elaborates on the relation between mind and body by presenting us the 
world as a mental realm within which all of our other ideas about nature and its workings are 
kept intact. 
 
                                                 
57 Skrbina (2005), p. 3. 
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